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feat: ALLOW_PRIVATE_ADDRESSES to opt out of the SSRF checks (closes #1036)

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The SSRF guard rejects any address that isn't globally routable, which breaks
proxy/VPN setups that resolve hosts into private or special-use ranges. The
reported case is Fake-IP clients (sing-box, Clash, Mihomo) that map YouTube to
the RFC 2544 benchmarking range 198.18.0.0/15 to tunnel the traffic; MeTube
rejected it with "Refusing to fetch internal address" even though yt-dlp itself
handles it fine.

Add a boolean ALLOW_PRIVATE_ADDRESSES (default false) that, when set, skips both
layers: validate_url returns after scheme validation without the internal-host
checks, and the connect-time socket guard is not installed. Threaded to the
download subprocess via Download so the guard sees it too. Scheme validation
(http/https only) still applies. Documented in the README as a trust-your-network
opt-out that disables SSRF protection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alex Shnitman
2026-07-21 07:44:38 +03:00
parent 13cb65d931
commit e061a8a5ba
6 changed files with 57 additions and 10 deletions
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app/url_guard.py
+17 -2
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ def _guarded_getaddrinfo(host, *args, **kwargs):
return allowed
def install_socket_guard() -> None:
def install_socket_guard(allow_private: bool = False) -> None:
"""Enforce the no-internal-hosts policy at actual connection time.
``validate_url`` only checks the *submitted* URL string; yt-dlp then follows
@@ -102,16 +102,27 @@ def install_socket_guard() -> None:
for any networking backend that resolves through Python's socket module
(urllib, requests). Native resolvers — notably curl_cffi/libcurl used by
``--impersonate`` — bypass this and rely on network isolation as the backstop.
When *allow_private* is set (``ALLOW_PRIVATE_ADDRESSES``), the guard is not
installed at all, so proxy/VPN setups that route through private or Fake-IP
ranges keep working.
"""
if allow_private:
return
socket.getaddrinfo = _guarded_getaddrinfo
def validate_url(url: str) -> str | None:
def validate_url(url: str, allow_private: bool = False) -> str | None:
"""Return an error message if the URL is disallowed, else ``None``.
Inputs without a ``://`` scheme separator (bare video IDs, ``ytsearch:``
and other yt-dlp search/extractor prefixes) are allowed unchanged so that
non-URL entries keep working.
When *allow_private* is set (``ALLOW_PRIVATE_ADDRESSES``), the internal-host
and internal-address checks are skipped so that trusted proxy/VPN setups —
e.g. Fake-IP clients that resolve YouTube to ``198.18.0.0/15`` — can be used.
Scheme validation (http/https only) still applies.
"""
if not isinstance(url, str):
return 'Invalid URL'
@@ -130,6 +141,10 @@ def validate_url(url: str) -> str | None:
if not hostname:
return 'URL is missing a host'
if allow_private:
# Environment is explicitly trusted: skip the SSRF address checks.
return None
if _hostname_is_blocked(hostname):
return f'Refusing to fetch internal host "{hostname}"'