The SSRF guard rejects any address that isn't globally routable, which breaks
proxy/VPN setups that resolve hosts into private or special-use ranges. The
reported case is Fake-IP clients (sing-box, Clash, Mihomo) that map YouTube to
the RFC 2544 benchmarking range 198.18.0.0/15 to tunnel the traffic; MeTube
rejected it with "Refusing to fetch internal address" even though yt-dlp itself
handles it fine.
Add a boolean ALLOW_PRIVATE_ADDRESSES (default false) that, when set, skips both
layers: validate_url returns after scheme validation without the internal-host
checks, and the connect-time socket guard is not installed. Threaded to the
download subprocess via Download so the guard sees it too. Scheme validation
(http/https only) still applies. Documented in the README as a trust-your-network
opt-out that disables SSRF protection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
validate_url only inspects the submitted URL string. yt-dlp then follows HTTP
redirects and resolves media URLs from remote metadata without re-checking, so
an allowed URL that 302s to http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud metadata) or an
RFC1918 host is still fetched — the guard's own docstring scoped this out.
Install a getaddrinfo guard in the download subprocess that re-validates every
resolved address at actual connect time, covering redirects and DNS rebinding
for any backend resolving through Python's socket module (urllib, requests).
Loopback is permitted so locally-configured proxies keep working; link-local,
RFC1918 and unique-local are blocked. Native resolvers (curl_cffi/libcurl via
--impersonate) bypass this and rely on network isolation as the backstop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
validate_url() previously returned None (allow) on socket.gaierror, so a
host that failed to resolve at check time was passed straight to yt-dlp. A
host we cannot resolve is a host we cannot verify as non-internal, and it may
resolve differently when yt-dlp fetches it. Reject it instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
User-submitted URLs were passed straight to yt-dlp's generic extractor,
letting the server fetch internal endpoints (cloud metadata, loopback,
RFC1918 hosts). Add a url_guard.validate_url check at every URL ingress
(add, subscribe, and nested playlist recursion) that rejects non-http(s)
schemes and hosts resolving to non-global addresses, while leaving bare
video IDs and search prefixes untouched.
Alex Shnitman